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nothing real, but because they were not included in his ideal of perfection. But the God of Spinoza is left without them, because the words good, perfect, and the like, taken in a moral sense, have no absolute significance, but are simply signs of "prejudices" of the human mind; and, further, because a *force*, abstractly considered, can have no moral character. God's "love" of himself, and of men in himself, can only be considered as a kind of mechanical consequence, or "virtue" of the operation of intellect.

There is abundant evidence to show that Spinoza possessed a nature deeply attuned to idealism. This may account for much that is inspiring in his doctrines of practical ethics and for many portions of his phraseology which the principles of his geometry of thought would not warrant.

But this is not the place for extended criticism. Many, doubtless, will be led by the occurrence of this second centenary of Spinoza's death to study his works, and to weigh his teaching. Like all human productions, they contain, in intimate union, large measures of fundamental truth, mixed with error. The mastery of his system, accompanied by a strictly just correction of its errors and appreciation of its truth, will be the best tribute that any can pay to the memory of one whose life was blameless, and who was undoubtedly an earnest and intrepid seeker after truth.

KANT'S "ÆSTHETIC."*

BY DAVID WARREN PHIPPS.

I.

THE IDEA OF A CRITIQUE OF THE PURE REASON.

Kant criticises the human reason with special reference to its ability to attain knowledge transcending sensuous experience. He assumes Mind and independent Thing; and begins with the hypothesis that the seeming characteristics of the thing are really from the mind, and not marks of the thing-in-itself. For the

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contrary hypothesis, as held by Locke—that the qualities perceived are wholly in the thing, which impresses its character upon the passive mind—had been shown by Hume to leave no valid ground for universal judgments. For example: the notion of Causality has no warrant in the sense-impression (which gives only a relation of *sequence*, that has been exalted into a notion of causality by mere habit), and is to be classed as one of the illusions of the mind. But Kant thinks the mind can be justified not only in the addition of the Principle of Causality to the sense-perceptions, but in synthetical *a priori* judgments in general. Assuming it to be conceded that all real (as distinguished from merely formal) judgment is synthetical, he inquires how synthetical judgments are possible *a priori*. This question comprehends:—

1. How can there be a science of mathematics *a priori*; or, how is pure mathematics possible?

2. How can there be an *a priori* science of nature? or, how is pure physics possible?

3. How is metaphysics possible?

Having committed himself to the theory that the mind has cognitions (in sense-experience, namely) which come from without itself, and which therefore cannot be known from beforehand; and that it also has in itself cognitions independent of these empirical ones, whose office it is to systematize or “form” the latter, Kant should, for consistency, separate the sense-object from its independent or *a priori* setting. But we soon learn that the sense-impression, or a *posteriori* representation, cannot be given without the help of the *a priori*. However, he is not willing to abandon the object given by sense, as distinguished from the object thought by the understanding. So he proceeds, in the *Æsthetic*, to tell us about the sense-object; while the *Logic* is intended to explain the action of the understanding upon the sense object which the *Æsthetic* expounds.

In the *Æsthetic* we shall expect Kant to prove: 1. That there is a *a priori* cognition in what he calls the intuition-object; that is, cognition distinct from, and independent of, sense-cognition. 2. That this *a priori* cognition is intuition—is a process of the sense, and not conception, the process of the understanding. 3. That it is possible, and how it is possible, for space and time, as *a priori* cognitions, to be synthetically united with sense-impres-

sions. 4. That his exposition of space and time shows the possibility of *pure* mathematics as a synthetical science.

II.

REMARKS CONCERNING THE PLAN AND EXECUTION OF THE ÆSTHETIC.

On the assumption that the thing is *yonder*, and that the mind is *here*, with marks or determinations of its own to apply to the thing, it results that the mind needs a receptivity, or faculty of becoming aware of the thing, as well as a power of thinking or determining it. Accordingly, in the beginning of the *Æsthetic*, Kant attempts, by means of definitions, to adjust the analysis of the object of experience to this view, and to show that even in receptivity there is also spontaneity. It is the spontaneous element in sense itself that forms the special subject of the *Æsthetic*; and as Kant holds that this spontaneity is wholly comprised in the representations familiarly called space and time, the *Æsthetic* may be described as the critique of these two representations. In completing this critique, Kant intends (1) to give a "metaphysical" exposition of space and time; (2) to give a "transcendental" exposition of the same; (3) to draw the proper conclusions as to what space and time are and are not; (4) to elucidate his conception of space and time in answer to objections; (5) to state the bearing of the result upon the question, How is synthesis possible *a priori*; (6) to show that his exposition of space and time explains the possibility of mathematics as a synthetical science *a priori*.

As regards the execution of his work, the following defects are noticeable :

1. He has placed a portion of the definition of Sense, namely, external sense and internal sense, under the title of Metaphysical Exposition of Space.

2. He has mingled the transcendental with the metaphysical exposition.

3. The exposition being generally the same for space and time, he would have done better to explain them together.

4. He has proved that the sensuous in cognition is dependent upon the non-sensuous; but he has not proved that the non-sensuous is independent of the sensuous.

5. He has not proved that the non-sensuous (or *a priori*) in intuition is itself intuition, and not conception.

6. His exposition of space and time show them to be the *necessary*, but do not show them to be the *sufficient* ground for the possibility of mathematics as an *a priori* science. To remedy the defects of arrangement—but not the defects of proof—and to bring the form of the work into accordance with the above plan, we will attempt—

III.

RESTATEMENT OF THE *ÆSTHETIC*.

Definitions.

Things being separate from the mind, it is evident that, in order to have cognition relate *immediately* to them, they must in some way *affect* the mind. Hence, the mind must have a faculty of *receptivity*, whereby it may become aware of things, in order that objects may be produced which the mental spontaneity may *think*, that is, characterize. Accordingly, the “thing-in-itself” affects the *senses*, occasioning what is called a *sensation*. But this sensation is a merely *subjective* affection, and, in order that it may appear as *object*, the faculty of receptivity, which is called *SENSE*, must have the capacity of receiving *representations* by means of this sensation. And, moreover, these representations cannot appear except in certain media, namely, space and time. A representation so appearing is called an *intuition*; or, more precisely, an *empirical intuition*. Our knowledge, therefore, can relate immediately to things, only by intuition. The product of intuition is the undetermined object, to which the mind affixes marks or determinations by means of the faculty of *UNDERSTANDING*, thus converting it into a *conception*. There can be no cognition without the united action of sense and understanding. The object, in so far as it is produced by intuition, is called *phenomenon*; and that which sensation contributes to this object, is called its *matter*. But the space and time elements of the intuition-object appear not as sensation, but as that in which the diversity of the matter is made susceptible of arrangement by the understanding; consequently they must be in the mind *a priori*. This *a priori* element is called the *form*. So that an intuition-

object has two elements—matter and form; the one is occasioned from without; the other is originated from within—is spontaneous. The one is *a posteriori*; the other is *a priori*.

The *a priori* element is called *pure* intuition; the word *pure* being prefixed to the name of any representation to denote that the representation is unmixed with sensation. "Thus, if I take away from our representation of a body all that the understanding thinks as belonging to it, as substance, force, divisibility, etc., and also whatever belongs to sensation, as impenetrability, hardness, color, etc., yet there is still something left us of this empirical intuition, namely extension and shape," and the time in which the sensations occurred. That part of sense by which we represent objects as without us in space, is called external sense, and its process and representation are called external intuition; while that part by which the mind contemplates its internal states as in time, is called internal sense, and its process and representation are called internal intuition.

Having separated space and time from the sensation element of the intuition-object, we will inquire more specifically what they are. First, are they real existences? Or, second, are they relations of things-in-themselves? Or, third, do they belong to the subjective constitution of the mind alone? To answer these questions we will give, first a metaphysical and then a transcendental exposition of space and time. An exposition is metaphysical when it contains a clear, but not necessarily a detailed, account of the characters in the conception as it is given empirically (i. e., to ordinary reflection).

METAPHYSICAL EXPOSITION OF SPACE AND TIME.

1. A general conception is a union of marks or characteristics which the understanding posits as common to many representations. Now space and time cannot be *general* conceptions; for we think all the spaces and times (extents and durations) as limitations of the one space and time; instead of thinking the one space and time as composed from the total aggregation of the extents and durations.

2. Space and time cannot be conceptions of *any* kind. For every conception must be considered as a representation which is contained in an infinite number of possible representations: while the conception itself completely contains no one of this possi-

ble multitude. But space and time are conceived as completely containing an infinity of possible extents and successions. Hence, as space and time are not conceptions, they must be intuitions.

3. Geometry determines the properties of space synthetically, and yet *a priori*; and from the representation of time we derive such propositions as "different times are not co-existent but successive." What must be the representation from which cognitions *a priori* arise? The properties of a conception are deduced analytically, and propositions so deduced go not beyond the conceptions. So that such propositions as "Space has only three dimensions," "Different times are not co-existent but successive," cannot arise from a conception; and as there are only two sorts of knowledge—intuition and conception—the original representations of space and time must be intuitions. And these intuitions must be in the mind anterior to the perception of objects, for no empirical representation carries the conviction of necessity and universality; hence, they must be pure intuitions, and belong to the *form* of sense.

In no other way can we conceive the possibility of geometry as a synthetical *a priori* science; and in no other way could we comprehend change; for example, how the same thing could be in a given place, and then not be in it.

TRANSCENDENTAL EXPOSITION OF SPACE AND TIME.

By a transcendental exposition, Kant means the exposition of a conception as a principle from which cognitions *a priori* may flow; hence it must be shown that they do flow from that principle as explained, and from no other.*

Time and space are not empirical conceptions, but they are necessary representations *a priori*; for we must have the representation of space and time in order to cognize objects as existing *extended* and in the relation of *situation* to each other and ourselves, or as existing *simultaneously* or *successively*.

*If a representation is a principle from which synthetical propositions *a priori* flow, it must itself be *a priori*, for there is no universality in mere sensation, upon which to predicate propositions *a priori*; hence, to explain a proposition as a principle, is to explain it as *a priori*; and to show that a conception is *a priori*, is transcendental thinking.

CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FOREGOING CONCEPTIONS, AS TO
WHAT SPACE AND TIME ARE.

1. They are not substances, nor properties or relations of substances ; for, if they were, they could not be cognized *a priori*.

2. They are only the *forms* of sense ; they belong exclusively to the mind.

3. Space is limited to *external* phenomena ; but time is a condition *a priori* of *all* phenomena ; because all representations (whether the object be external or internal), as mental affections, belong to the internal state.

4. Space and time do not apply to *things-in-themselves*—have no objective validity in reference to them. But space and time have objective validity in *phenomena* ; for phenomena belong wholly to the mind ; space and time, which are purely subjective and universal, apply to sensation, which is purely subjective and singular.

ELUCIDATION.

The foregoing theory admits that change is real to *us*, so the fact of change is no argument against the ideality of time.

It is evident that space and time are the only elements of the Transcendental *Æsthetic*, because “all other conceptions appertaining to sense—even that of motion, which unites in itself both elements—presupposes something empirical.”

THE RELATION OF THE *ÆSTHETIC* TO THE MAIN QUESTION.

“We have now completely before us one part of the solution of the general problem of transcendental philosophy, namely, the question, How are synthetical propositions *a priori* possible?” For we find ourselves in possession of pure *a priori* intuitions. These intuitions, we have found, contain cognitions which are not in the given conception, but when these cognitions are thought in a judgment with the given conception, they are thought as necessarily connected with that conception. For example : we have the conception “A straight line,” and we write with it the following : “can be drawn between *any* two points.” This predicate was not in the conception of straight line, “but is certainly found *a priori* in the intuition which corresponds to the

conception of straight line." As space relates only to that which is "yonder" to the mind, and which (the spaced) is cognized through the senses only, we can form no judgments by means of these pure intuitions, except judgments relating to possible sense objects.

IV.

SOME QUERIES, IN REGARD TO THE *ÆSTHETIC*.

[An imaginary Dialogue between Kant and his Serious Students].

Students.—When you tell us, Kant, that Subject and Object are two *things*; that the thing must represent itself to the mind as an Undetermined Object, to be characterized by the Understanding,—when you tell us this, what are we to understand?

Kant.—You are to understand that the Undetermined Object is a mere *Datum*. It has no marks like the thing-in-itself, and as yet it has received no character from the mind.

S.—An object without marks! An object without marks is *nothing*—to us. Do you mean to state that the *Datum* is *nothing*?

K.—Yes. It *would* be nothing without the Form, which belongs to the mind's receptivity. We can receive no representation except as capable of being related in space and time, which belong wholly to sense.

S.—But what *is* this Given-as-capable-of-being-related-in-space-and-time?

K.—It is the unregulated diversity of sensation, which is given through the senses.

S.—We understand now. The *sensations* are the representations that are produced by the exterior object or thing? These are the matter of our cognition?

K.—You are mistaken. The sensations are wholly subjective; they belong exclusively to our internal states. The thing-in-itself is only the *occasion* of the sensation.

S.—But you say the Given, the intuition-object, is solely this. Matter and Form—the matter being sensation, and the form being space and time. This object then, must be wholly from the mind? Neither matter nor form is from without?

K.—That is my position.

S.—How, then, did you find out that a thing-in-itself was the occasion of the object?

* * * * *

S.—Are we to understand that there are two mutually independent *sorts* of knowledge—the immediate and the mediate—*perception* of object and *thinking* of object?

K.—Certainly; and the object of the Critique is to show how they can be reconciled.

S.—Then, in order to prove that a cognition is *a priori*, it must be proved that it is independent of sensation, must it not?

K.—Yes. It must be made evident that the sensation could not exist without the anterior existence, in the mind, of the *a priori* cognition.

S.—In your exposition you have convinced us that the conceptions of space and time are necessary to the existence of the sensation; but that destroys the independence of the sensation, and we cannot see that you have proved the independence of space and time. Now, we remember that you have stated that there is no cognition of *object*—no *thought*—without reference to sensation; and our own consciousness (so far) confirms that statement. Instead of proving that space and time are *a priori* in the sense of being independent and necessary, have you not proved that there is no immediacy without mediation, and no mediation without immediacy?—that the distinction between the two is, that the one is individual, the other universal, while both are of the mind, and both necessary?

* * * * *

S.—We understand you to state that every conception must be considered as a representation which is contained in an infinite number of possible representations; while the conception itself completely contains no one of this possible multitude.

K.—I do so state.

S.—Space and time are contained in an infinite number of possible representations, are they not?

K.—Yes. But the extents and durations are also completely contained in space and time; in which respect they are unlike conceptions. And they are like intuitions in each being *one* and *only*. For an intuition is a representation that can be given only by a single object.

S.—Does not an extent or a duration contain *negation* of space or time, as well as contain space or time?

K.—Yes.

S.—Then the spaces and times (extents and durations) are *not*

completely contained in space and time : for the spaces and times contain negation—they contain some quantity of some quality, necessarily, actually, or contingently related, do they not? So that, after all, they do have, in this respect, the character of conceptions. And as to their being like an intuition in being *one*—an intuition's peculiarity is, that it is not contained in a multitude of representations; but space and time *are* so contained. Space and time are each one, as quantity is one. And as you say space and time, being capable of containing an infinity of extents and durations, cannot be fully represented in an extent or duration, and hence their full representation must be an intuition; so we might say (might we not?)—Quantity, being capable of containing an infinity of quantities, could not be fully expressed in a conception; hence, quantity must be an intuition?

* * * * *

S.—We would like to know how it is possible for space and time, as pure *a priori* cognitions, to be united with sensation?

K.—Sensation being subjective, and space and time also of the mind, and both being necessary to intuition, there arises no rational difficulty to their union.

S.—But this destroys their independence in the cognition of *object*. So that we must not say they are cognitions, but only elements of cognition;—unless there is a knowledge which is not knowledge of *object*.

* * * * *

S.—Do you hold that the pure intuitions of space and time are the *sufficient* ground for Pure Mathematics?

K.—Yes. For example : when, in a judgment *a priori* in geometry, we pass out beyond the given conception, we find something which is not discoverable in that conception, but which is certainly found in the intuition which corresponds with the conception.

S.—But if we find something in the intuition mentioned, how can we get it out without the Categories? How else can we produce mathematical science *a priori* from the intuition? And if the categories *must* be used, then shall we not be obliged to say that you have proved that space and time are the *necessary*, but not the *sufficient* ground of Pure Mathematics?

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S.—We thought you based the distinction between what you called *a priori* and *a posteriori* upon the fact that one was from

the nature of the mind, and the other was an impression from the thing. But now we find that you say both are of the mind. Where, then, is the propriety of the names? Wherein is the distinction?

K.—The distinction is this: the *a posteriori* knowledge begins with experience, so far as time is concerned; there is no knowing anything about the sensation until you have it; hence, it must be *individual*. But the *a priori* knowledge is that which lies ready in the mind anterior to all perception of objects; and, being a potentiality of the mind, in which all the sensations of all individual minds are related, is universal.

S.—We thought it a good saying of yours, that, “in respect of time, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience, but all begins with it.” What, then, do you mean by saying we have knowledge “anterior” to, and independent of experience; that is, know before we know? What can *potenti-ality* of knowing mean but that there is Absolute Mind which manifests itself in us in time? It seems to us that, as individual minds, we know only what we have experienced, whether it be what you call individual or what you call universal; and that your *a priori* knowledge, as *a priori*, means (if it means anything) that which is in the Universal or Divine Mind. As regards the individual mind, the *a priori* is nothing until it is experienced. The *a priori*, then, belongs not to *human* reason, but to REASON, to GOD. And, if so, then we know absolute reality.

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S.—When our instruction from you began, we thought the query was,—How attributes from the human mind could be applied to an object given from without. But now, when we have discovered that object and attribute both, are of the mind, and that neither is anything without the other, we are at a loss to know why the investigation in regard to synthesis should proceed further.

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S.—You say there are two general sources of knowledge—Sense and Understanding. Will you please tell us to which of these belongs the act by which we discover that which is unconditioned by space and time—the *a priori*? It does not seem as if it can be Sense, for all the sense-cognitions are conditioned by space and time. It cannot be understanding, for that gives no

object, but only the form in which objects are to be cognized when given. There is, then, a *third* source, which is the secret of all?

ANTHROPOLOGY.*

Translated from the German of Immanuel Kant by A. E. KROEGER.

PART FIRST—ANTHROPOLOGICAL DIDACTIC.

Concerning the Manner in which to Recognize the Internal as well as the External of Man.

BOOK FIRST.

Concerning the Faculty of Cognition.—General Remarks Concerning our External Senses.

§19. We can divide the sensations of our external senses into those of mechanical and those of chemical origin. To the former class belong the three higher, to the latter the two lower senses. The former are senses of perception (superficial), the latter are senses of enjoyment (intense appropriation). This is the reason why nausea, an inclination to relieve ourselves of what we have eat or drunk by the shortest way of the esophagus, that is, to vomit, has been given to man as a vital sensation of unusual degree; since so intense an appropriation might become dangerous to the animal.

But since there exists also a spiritual enjoyment, which results from the communication of thoughts, and which, when forced upon us and is not healthy for us as spiritual food, but found to be disagreeable—as, for instance, a repetition of the same witty or supposed to be witty sayings—and which may, therefore, also become unwholesome to us on account of that very sameness: we call the instinct of nature to get rid of this spiritual food, also nausea, for the sake of analogy; although it belongs to the internal sense.

*[Continued from Volume X., page 319].